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Abstract
Both pandemic and seasonal influenza are receiving more attention from mass media than ever before. Topics such as
epidemic severity and vaccination are changing the way in which we perceive the utility of disease prevention. Voluntary
influenza vaccination has been recently modeled using inductive reasoning games. It has thus been found that severe
epidemics may occur because individuals do not vaccinate and, instead, attempt to benefit from the immunity of their
peers. Such epidemics could be prevented by voluntary vaccination if incentives were offered. However, a key assumption
has been that individuals make vaccination decisions based on whether there was an epidemic each influenza season; no
other epidemiological information is available to them. In this work, we relax this assumption and investigate the
consequences of making more informed vaccination decisions while no incentives are offered. We obtain three major
results. First, individuals will not cooperate enough to constantly prevent influenza epidemics through voluntary vaccination
no matter how much they learned about influenza epidemiology. Second, broadcasting epidemiological information richer
than whether an epidemic occurred may stabilize the vaccination coverage and suppress severe influenza epidemics. Third,
the stable vaccination coverage follows the trend of the perceived benefit of vaccination. However, increasing the amount
of epidemiological information released to the public may either increase or decrease the perceived benefit of vaccination.
We discuss three scenarios where individuals know, in addition to whether there was an epidemic, (i) the incidence, (ii) the
vaccination coverage and (iii) both the incidence and the vaccination coverage, every influenza season. We show that
broadcasting both the incidence and the vaccination coverage could yield either better or worse vaccination coverage than
broadcasting each piece of information on its own.
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Introduction
The increasing mediatization of medical and epidemiological
information determines an increasing role of social behavior for
the success of routine vaccination programs. Vaccine promotions,
epidemiological newscasts and rumors change the way in which
individuals perceive the utility of disease prevention. This
phenomenon has been described by empirical studies discussing
vaccination against human papillomavirus [1], measles-mumps-
rubella [2,3], poliomyelitis [4] and influenza [5,6]. Social behavior
is particularly important for influenza, which is a seasonal disease
and remains a continual epidemic and pandemic threat. In this
case, individuals need to make yearly vaccination decisions that
are all potentially biased by their perception of costs versus benefits
of vaccination.
Mathematical modeling of the potential impact of mass media
on the course of epidemics has become a topic of interest only in
the past few years [7–10]. Several problems have been discussed:
sequential disease outbreaks due to the psychological impact of the
reported incidence [7], coexistence of multiple endemic states
caused by media coverage [8], and the effect of mass media on
constant and seasonal vaccination programs [9,10]. The mathe-
matical techniques utilized so far are compartmental models
expressed as systems of ordinary differential equations. However, a
technique more adapted to describe decision making and adapt-
ability of individuals in the process of voluntary vaccination is
game theory.
Game theory has been successfully applied to modeling the
impact of social behavior on vaccination coverage (i.e., the
proportion of the population that gets vaccinated). Deductive
reasoning games have been used to predict the voluntary
vaccination coverage for pathogens that provide permanent
immunity [11–13]. In the case of pathogens that do not provide
permanent immunity (e.g., influenza), several modeling ideas have
been studied. An evolutionary game was proposed where an
individual copies the vaccination strategy of another with a
probability depending on the success of the vaccination strategy
[14]. A different approach is that based on inductive reasoning
games [15] initially applied to modeling financial markets [16]. In
this case, it is conjectured that individuals make repeated
vaccination decisions based on their expectations about future
epidemics that are, in turn, determined by their collective
vaccination coverage. Inductive reasoning games were applied to
understanding the dynamics of influenza vaccination coverage
assuming both uniform mixing of individuals [17,18] and mixing
through complex contact networks [19].
In this paper, we generalize previous modeling work [17,18] to
study the potential impact of mass media on social behavior and,
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reasoning games of influenza vaccination assumed that, at the
end of each influenza season, the only epidemiological information
available to individuals was whether an epidemic took place. One
of the main outcomes of the models with uniform mixing is that
influenza epidemics gradually decrease in severity and are
occasionally prevented [17]. These models then predict the
occurrence of a severe epidemic because individuals expect that
their peers will vaccinate and they attempt to free-ride on herd
immunity. After the severe epidemic, individuals vaccinate again
in increasing numbers, year after year, until an epidemic is
prevented and the scenario repeats. Various vaccination incentives
were theoretically investigated for their efficiency in preventing
severe epidemics [17]. Here we investigate the potential impact of
broadcasting various epidemiological information for individuals
to evaluate their influenza vaccination decisions at the end of the
season. We analyze how epidemiological newscasts may influence
the perceived benefit of vaccination, change social behavior, and
prevent severe epidemics.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section we
introduce our generalized individual-level inductive reasoning
game by a set of eight assumptions. It turns out that, in the case of
large populations, the mean-field approximation of the game
typically provides an adequate description of the coverage
dynamics. Hence, a full analysis of the inductive reasoning game
is not typically necessary. Then, we develop this approximation in
the form of a one-dimensional map where influenza epidemiology
and social behavior remain broadly specified by a few unrest-
rictive axioms. Analysis of this iterated map leads to three key
results: (a) individuals will not cooperate enough to consistently
prevent influenza epidemics; (b) broadcasting epidemiological
information in addition to whether or not an epidemic occurred
may stabilize the vaccination coverage and prevent severe
epidemics; and (c) the stable vaccination coverage follows the
trend of the perceived benefit of vaccination. However, increasing
the amount of epidemiological information released to the public
may either increase or decrease the perceived benefit of
vaccination. To see these results at work, we analyze several
model examples. First, we discuss a slight generalization of a
previously published model displaying periodically recurring
severe epidemics [17,18] that serves as reference. Then, we
discuss two models where individuals know, every influenza
season, either (i) the incidence or (ii) the vaccination coverage, in
addition to whether there was an epidemic. We show that
broadcasting either epidemiological indicator may stabilize the
vaccination coverage and prevent severe epidemics. Finally, we
discuss two models where individuals know both the incidence
and the vaccination coverage every influenza season. One model
assumes that individuals are risk-avoiding and use the available
information to better protect themselves against infection, while
the other assumes that individuals are risk-seeking and use the
information to take even greater risk in the attempt to free-ride
on herd immunity. We show that broadcasting both the incidence
and the vaccination coverage could yield either better or worse
vaccination coverage than broadcasting each piece of information
on its own. We make concrete assumptions about influenza
epidemiology and present numerical results. Finally, we conclude
our work.
Methods
Our model describes a large population of individuals. We
account only for the occurrence of epidemics and we do not
consider outbreaks since outbreaks become decreasingly important
as the population size increases. Influenza transmission models
describing large populations [20–22] have demonstrated the
existence of a critical coverage level such that: if the coverage is
below the critical level, an epidemic will occur, otherwise the
epidemic will be prevented. Our inductive reasoning game
includes a simple model of this coverage threshold (see
Assumptions q1–2 below), assumes that the vaccine offers
complete protection for one year (n.b., increasing the critical
vaccination coverage may account for effects of treatment and
imperfect vaccines), and proceeds as follows. We consider a large
population of individuals acting in their own self-interest. Each
individual makes personal decisions as to whether or not get
vaccinated against influenza. The collective outcome of these
decisions drives influenza epidemiology which, in turn, affects
future individual-level decisions. The model proceeds iteratively in
two steps per influenza season. The first step is at the beginning of
the season when every individual makes their vaccination decision
depending on their experience with flu vaccination. An epidemic
may occur every influenza season, depending on how the achieved
coverage compares with the critical coverage. The second step is at
the end of the influenza season when every individual scores their
last vaccination decision. We assume that, if they did not get
vaccinated, an individual evaluates their decision favorably if they
avoided infection (the score has the maximum value of 1) and
unfavorably if they got infected (the score has the minimum value
of 0). Vaccinated individuals establish the scores of their decisions
based on the available epidemiological information. Then, each
individual updates their vaccination experience using the score of
their last vaccination decision. The whole process repeats in the
next influenza season.
Model definition
For an axiomatic description of the model, we denote the
coverage by p, the critical coverage by pc, and the probability of
getting infected by q. We now present the assumptions that define
our generalized inductive reasoning game in mathematical form.
Assumption 1. We consider a number of N individuals that
make yearly vaccination decisions. The interest of the individuals
is to avoid getting infected, preferably without having to vaccinate.
They act in their own interest and do not communicate their
vaccination decisions to each other.
Assumption 2. To make their vaccination decision, each
individual uses their past experience of vaccination outcomes.
Thus, individuals independently decide whether or not to
vaccinate using inductive reasoning.
Assumption 3. An individual weights their previous va-
ccination outcomes with respect to their most recent vaccination
outcome. A parameter s discounts the previous year’s vaccination
outcome with respect to the outcome of the present year
(0ƒsv1). For s~0, individuals completely ignore the outcome
of previous seasons and, as a consequence, do not use inductive
reasoning. If s were equal to 1, individuals would not discount the
previous vaccination seasons; therefore, the vaccination outcome
of the present season (i.e., season n) would be as important as any
of the previous seasons.
Assumption 4. We define a vaccination decision as a
realization x(i)
n of a Bernoulli variable with parameter w(i)
n that
further depends on a variable v(i)
n . i and n are positive integers;
i~1,2,:::,N labels the individual and n§0 labels the season. If
individual i decides to get vaccinated in season n then x(i)
n ~1,
otherwise x(i)
n ~0. w(i)
n is the probability that individual i vaccinates
in season n. The variable v(i)
n characterizes the pro-vaccination
experience of the ith individual (see details in Assumption 7) and
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n . The domains of the variables are as follows:
x(i)
n [f0,1g, w(i)
n [½0,1 , and v(i)
n [½0,1=(1{s)).
Assumption 5. In year n, a set of N vaccination decisions is
made fx(i)
n ;1ƒiƒNg that, together with the pro-vaccination
experiences in year n, determine the pro-vaccination experiences
of all individuals in year (nz1), fv
(i)
nz1;1ƒiƒNg, which further
determine fw
(i)
nz1;1ƒiƒNg, the parameters of the Bernoulli
variables in year (nz1). Then, the set of vaccination decisions in
year (nz1) is obtained fx
(i)
nz1,1ƒiƒNg. Our inductive reasoning
game is an array of sets of vaccination decisions.
Assumption 6. The infection event of individual i in year n is
described by a variable z(i)
n . (If individual i got infected in season n
then z(i)
n ~1, otherwise z(i)
n ~0.) The infection process is as follows.
If x(i)
n ~1 then z(i)
n ~0.I fx(i)
n ~0, then z(i)
n is a realization of a
Bernoulli variable with parameter q(pn), where pn~
PN
i~1 x(i)
n =N
is the coverage achieved that year. That is, if individuals vaccinate,
they are fully protected, otherwise they risk infection with
probability q(pn).
Assumption 7. At the end of the influenza season of year n,
each individual provides a score between 0 and 1 for their
vaccination decision x(i)
n based on their infection status z(i)
n and
broadly available epidemiological information. We have three
cases: (a1) if x(i)
n ~0 and z(i)
n ~1 then the score is 1 and
v
(i)
nz1~sv(i)
n z1; that is, if individual i did not get vaccinated and
got infected, then the individual considers that the vaccination was
necessary; (a2) if x(i)
n ~0 and z(i)
n ~0 then the score is 0 and
v
(i)
nz1~sv(i)
n ; which means that if individual i did not get vaccinated
and did not get infected, then they consider that the vaccination
was unnecessary and (b) if x(i)
n ~1, then the score of the
vaccination decision is F(pn) and v
(i)
nz1~sv(i)
n zF(pn). That is, if
individual i got vaccinated then they did not get infected and use
the broadcast epidemiological information to evaluate their
vaccination decision (see discussion below);
Assumption 8. The probability that an individual chooses to
get vaccinated is updated as follows
w
(i)
nz1~v
(i)
nz1=½(1{snz1)=(1{s) : ð1Þ
That is, an individual’s probability to get vaccinated in the next
season is given by the updated cumulative vaccination experience.
We have normalized v
(i)
nz1 by (1{snz1)=(1{s) because this factor
is the maximum possible value for v
(i)
nz1 if individual i would have
fully benefited from vaccination in all of the n influenza seasons.
We further introduce general assumptions for the functions q(:)
and F(:) that result from their biological and sociological meaning.
The function q(:) represents the probability of getting infected
versus coverage and must illustrate both a critical coverage and a
herd immunity effect (i.e., higher overall coverage must offer
higher overall protection). We express this mathematically by the
following two assumptions.
Assumption q1. q : ½0,1 ?½0,1  is continuous. We also re-
quire that q(:) is differentiable everywhere in the domain except
at pc.
Assumption q2. q(p)~0 for pcƒpƒ1 and q’(p)v0 for
0ƒpvpc, where the prime denotes the derivative with respect to
the argument.
We note that the q-functions obtained from analysis of the
Susceptible-Infected-Recoved and Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-
Recoved models [17] are compatible with the above assumptions.
A vaccinated individual evaluates their vaccination decision
depending on the epidemiological outcome of the influenza season
which we express in terms of the vaccination coverage. We make
assumptions on the analytic form of F(:) to reflect the fact that
the individual tries to benefit from herd immunity and that they are
not satisfied to have had vaccinated when epidemics were prevented.
Assumption F1. F : ½0,1 ?½0,1  is continuous and
differentiable everywhere in the domain except at p~pc.
Assumption F2. F’(p)ƒ0 wherever F(:) is differentiable.
That is, individuals would try to benefit from herd immunity; as
coverage increases, the pro-vaccination experience gained by
individuals who got vaccinated decreases.
Assumption F3. F(p)v1 for pcƒpƒ1. That is, individuals
are not fully satisfied to have had vaccinated when epidemics were
prevented.
The score function F(:) may be interpreted as the perceived benefit of
vaccination, normalized between 0 and 1. It depends both on the
epidemiological information available to vaccinated individuals and
how they react to this information. Such a function could be
grounded in terms of how individuals seek to maximize their utility,
given their estimates of infection risk. We take the function as a given,
and note that Assumptions F1–3 are plausible for any underlying
model of self-interested behavior. To address risk-avoiding versus
risk-seeking vaccination strategies, we discuss score functions in Sec.
that combine distinct pieces of epidemiological information (infection
incidence and vaccination coverage) in two different ways.
Mean-field approximation
We now derive a deterministic approximation for the
vaccination coverage dynamics in the limit of a large population
(i.e., N??). We denote by S:T the average over the realizations
of the game and introduce the variable pn:SpnT for the average
coverage over the realizations of the game in the limit of large
N. By the Central Limit Theorem (using the Lyapunov condition),
we have that pn~
PN
i~1 x(i)
n =N is normally distributed with
average pn and standard deviation
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ PN
i~1 s
(i)2
n =N2
q
, where
s(i)
n is the standard deviation of the distribution of x(i)
n (i.e.,
s(i)2
n ~w(i)
n (1{w(i)
n )). Since
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ PN
i~1 s
(i)2
n =N
q
is bounded from
above, the dynamics of pn at large finite N can be approximated
by adding Gaussian noise with amplitude *
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N{1
p
to the
dynamics of pn. However, in most of the phase space of p, the
noise will not change the qualitative dynamics of the orbit and
mean-field will be a suitable approximation. Furthermore, since
the noise amplitude is small and the functions q(:) and F(:) are
continuous, we have Sq(p)T&q(p) and SF(p)T&F(p).
From the definition of pn, we immediately obtain
pn~
PN
i~1 Sw(i)
n T=N. Now, following Assumption 7, it is straight-
forward to arrive at the equations listed below according to the
scoring tree for vaccination decisions
branch expected population fraction expected v(i) update
(a1) (1{pn)q(pn) v
(i)
nz1~sv(i)
n z1;
(a2) (1{pn)½1{q(pn)  v
(i)
nz1~sv(i)
n ;
(b) pn v
(i)
nz1~sv(i)
n zF(pn):
ð2Þ
The weighted average of Eqs. (2) yields
unz1~sunz(1{pn)q(pn)zpnF(pn), ð3Þ
where u denotes the average of v(i) over the entire population. Taking
the population average of Eq. (1), we obtain pnz1~(1{s)unz1=
(1{snz1), which in the limit of n?? yields simply
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Combining Eqs. (3) and (4), we obtain a mean-field autonomous
approximation of the coverage dynamics of the inductive reasoning
game without regard to the individual-level processes
pnz1~M(pn;s):spnz(1{s)½(1{pn)q(pn)zpnF(pn) : ð5Þ
Our dynamical system, M(:;s), is defined on the unit interval.
Epidemiological indicators
It is straightforward to relate epidemiological variables to the
framework of the mean-field model. We introduce N 
n for the
number of susceptible individuals in season n and r 
n(:) for its
distribution over realizations of the game. The incidence in one
influenza season is defined as the number of new cases per
susceptible individual. Since we model the number of cases among
the susceptible individuals by a binomial distribution with
parameter q(pn) (Assumption 6) and pn~(N{N 
n)=N, the
expected incidence in season n, denoted by SInT, is given by
SInT~
X N
i~N 
n
r 
n(N 
n)
q(pn)N 
n
N 
n
~Sq(pn)T&q(pn); ð6Þ
i.e., the probability that an unvaccinated individual becomes
infected. Prevalence is defined as the fraction of cases in the
general population. The expected prevalence in season n, denoted
by SPnT, can be written as
SPnT~
X N
i~N 
n
r 
n(N 
n)
q(pn)N 
n
N
~S(1{pn)q(pn)T&(1{pn)q(pn): ð7Þ
Other epidemiological indicators may be derived in a similar
fashion.
Results
General results
We first derive three results that apply to all models satisfying
Assumptions 1–8, q1–2 and F1–3.
Proposition 1. The mean-field model has no attractor
included in the ½pc,1  interval.
Proof. In the ½pc,1  interval, the mean-field model is given by
pnz1~pn½sz(1{s)F(pn) : ð8Þ
Since F(p)v1 for pcƒpƒ1 (Assumption F3) we obtain that
pnz1vpn. Thus, the ½pc,1  interval is repelling. An orbit starting
in the ½pc,1  interval decreases monotonically until an iterate
belongs to the ½0,pc) interval.
Remark 1-1. The ½pc,1  interval may contain points that
belong to an attractor of the mean-field model.
These results have important consequences for public health.
They demonstrate that, under very general assumptions, a group
of self-interested individuals will not cooperate enough to
consistently prevent influenza epidemics through voluntary recurrent
vaccinations. Furthermore, if the score function fulfills assumptions
F1–3, even a public health program that manages to increase the
perceived benefits of vaccination would not eliminate influenza
epidemics. However, a public health program may successfully
control the influenza coverage dynamics to achieve more modest
goals such as maintaining a high time-average of the coverage
and/or a stable coverage. In this study we address the goal of
stabilizing the vaccination coverage close to, yet below the critical
level. We thus proceed with the fixed-point analysis of the mean-
field model given by Eq. (5) in the range where pvpc and
epidemics are not prevented.
Proposition 2. The fixed point of the mean-field model,
denoted by ^ p p, has the following properties:
1. ^ p p is the unique solution in the (0,pc) interval of the equation
q(^ p p)~
^ p p½1{F(^ p p) 
1{^ p p
:h(^ p p), ð9Þ
and does not depend on the memory parameter s.
2. The stability of ^ p p is given by the condition
swS, where
S:1z2½q0(^ p p)(1{^ p p){q(^ p p)=^ p pz^ p pF0(^ p p) 
{1; Sv1:
ð10Þ
Furthermore, assuming that the functions q(:) and F(:) are
three times differentiable in the (0,pc) interval, ^ p p typically loses
stability through a period-doubling bifurcation.
Proof
1. The equation for ^ p p is immediately obtained by setting the
fixed-point condition for Eq. (5); i.e., pnz1~pn:^ p p. Using
Assumptions F1–3 we immediately have that h’(p)§0 in the
½0,pc  interval, h(0)~0 and h(pc)§0. Using also Assumptions
q1–2, Eq. (9) has a unique solution in the (0,pc) interval. Given
that Eq. (9) is independent of s, ^ p p is independent of s, as well.
2. Let us denote by l the derivative of the mean-field map at the
fixed point ^ p p; l is given by
l~sz(1{s)½q’(^ p p)(1{^ p p){q(^ p p)zF(^ p p)z^ p pF’(^ p p) : ð11Þ
The fixed point ^ p p is linearly stable if and only if {1vlv1
(Ref. [23], Chapter 4). Using Eq. (9) to substitute F(^ p p) and
the Assumptions q1–2 and F1–3, we obtain straightforwardly
that lv1 is always satisfied and the condition {1vl can be
w r i t t e ni nt h ef o r mo ft h eE q .( 1 0 ) .N o t et h a tSv1 since the
square bracket in the definition of S is strictly negative.
Thus, the fixed point ^ p p always has a nonempty domain of
stability in the parameter space, ½S,1 \½0,1 =1.T h ef i x e d
point ^ p p may only lose stability as s decreases below S; i.e., l
decreases below minus one. With the additional require-
ments
L
2M(p;s)
LsLp
       
(^ p p;S)
=0, ð12Þ
1
2
L
2M(p;s)
Lp2
       
2
(^ p p;S)
z
1
3
L
3M(p;s)
Lp3
       
(^ p p;S)
=0, ð13Þ
the dynamical system M(:;s) satisfies the conditions for
having a generic period-doubling bifurcation at (^ p p;S) –R e f .
[23], Chapter 4, Theorem 4.3 and Ref. [24], Chapter 2.3.
Other bifurcations are possible, depending on the particular
choices for the functions q(:) and F(:).H o w e v e r ,t h e ya r en o t
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tion of these functions will break the bifurcation into generic
ones that survive such perturbations. Equation (12) can be
rewritten as
1{F(^ p p) ½  {^ p pF’(^ p p)zq(^ p p){(1{^ p p)q’(^ p p)=0, ð14Þ
and is always satisfied virtue of Assumptions F1–3 and the
fact that ^ p p[(0,pc). Equation (13) requires that the functions
q(:) and F(:) are three times differentiable in the (0,pc)
interval and is typically satisfied; i.e., if violated, a smooth
arbitrary small perturbation of these functions will have Eq.
(13) satisfied.
We note that the period doubling bifurcation can be either direct or
inverse (Ref. [24], Chapter 2.3). In the case of a direct bifurcation, the
fixed point ^ p p loses stability at s~S and, simultaneously, a period-two
attractor is created. In the vicinity of the bifurcation, the period-two
orbit is symmetric about ^ p p, having one iterate above and one below
the fixed point. Hence, mild and severe influenza epidemics alternate.
We consider this scenario to be an inferior outcome since the health
care system has to manage more severe epidemics while the average
coverage remains the same. In the case of an inverse bifurcation, the
stable fixed point ^ p p merges with an unstable period-two orbit and loses
stability at s~S. Past bifurcation, the local dynamical structure
consists of the unstable fixed point ^ p p without any attractor in the
neighborhood. Hence, an orbit in this region will evolve to some
distant attractor. A class of such attractors is created through
codimension-one border-collision bifurcations. Due to the disconti-
nuity of the model derivative at pc, critical periodic orbits with points
in the ½pc,1  interval are created at particular values of s.D e n o t i n gt h e
kth iterate of the model map by M½k (:;s), the equation of a period-k
critical orbit is M½k (pc;s)~pc. The critical periodic orbit may turn
into a noise-robust attractor having at least one point in the (pc,1 
interval; see also discussion in Ref. [18]. If the fixed point ^ p p loses
stability through an inverse period doubling bifurcation and is
captured by such an attractor, then complex coverage dynamics
ensues where influenza epidemics are occasionally prevented.
Finally, we present a variational result that links changes in the
score function to changes in the stationary coverage.
Proposition 3. Let dF : ½0,1 ?½0,1  be an infinitesimal
deformation of F(:) such that the function F(:)zdF(:) satisfies
Assumptions F1–3. If the function F(:) is perturbed by the amount
dF(:), then the fixed point ^ p p is perturbed by an amount d^ p p having
the same sign as dF(^ p p).
Proof. Applying Eq. (9) for the functions F(:) and
F(:)zdF(:), and subtracting, we obtain in the first infinitesimal
order
dF(^ p p)~d^ p p½{q’(^ p p)(1{^ p p)=^ p pzq(^ p p)=^ p p2 : ð15Þ
According to Assumptions q1–2, the factor in the square bracket of
Eq. (15) is positive.
Remark 3-1. The above result can be immediately
generalized for finite deformations of F(:) that are performed
through sequential infinitesimal steps.
Remark 3-2. Stability of the fixed point ^ p p may be lost due to
deformations because the stability condition (10) depends on F’(^ p p).
The above results show that the stable vaccination coverage
follows the trend of the perceived benefit of vaccination (i.e., score
function F(:)). Providing more epidemiological information to the
public may cause either an increase or a decrease in the perceived
benefit of vaccination, as we show by analyzing two different
strategies. Risk-avoiding individuals may use the additional
information to avoid infection risk and increase the value of their
score function. In contrast, risk-seeking individuals may perceive a
lower benefit to vaccination and attempt even more to free-ride on
herd immunity. Hence, broadcasting additional epidemiological
information may result in either increasing or decreasing the stable
vaccination coverage.
Model examples
To illustrate the results expressed by Propositions 1–3, we
discuss and compare five models. We use subscripts 1–3, 4a, 4b to
refer to the dynamical elements corresponding to the models 1–3,
4a, 4b, respectively. In each case, we assume that individuals
know, at the end of every influenza season, whether an epidemic
took place. In particular, for model 1, we assume that this is the
only information available, determining a certain form for the
function F(:). In fact, model 1 is only a slight generalization of the
basic model previously studied [17,18] and serves as reference. For
the models 2, 3, 4a and 4b we assume that individuals are given
additional epidemiological information that determine other
functional forms for F(:), in each case. For the time being, we
leave the function q(:) unspecified. Later we discuss a choice of
function for q(:) and present numerical results.
Model 1
In this model, at the end of each influenza season, individuals
know only whether there was an epidemic and vaccinated
individuals consider vaccination to have been worthwhile only if
there was an epidemic. The F-function is given by [18]
F1(p)~1{h(p{pc), ð16Þ
where h(:) is the unit step function defined as
h(x)~
1, if x§0;
0, if xv0:
 
ð17Þ
In Ref. [18], q(:) is a piecewise linear function. However, to
recover the qualitative features of the dynamics, it is sufficient that
q(:) satisfies Assumptions q1–2. Performing a similar analysis, we
immediately obtain that there are no fixed points and pc may be
attracting only from the left. The coverage dynamics around pc
proceeds in a cyclic fashion. When the coverage is less than pc,
individuals become infected and they increase their probability of
getting vaccinated in the next influenza season. The vaccination
coverage gradually approaches pc, until it eventually slightly
exceeds the critical level due to the stochastic nature of the
individual-level adaptive decision-making process. At this point, an
influenza epidemic does not occur. However, in the following
season, many individuals decide not to get vaccinated, as an
epidemic did not occur in the previous season; thus vaccination
coverage abruptly decreases in the vicinity of spc and a severe
epidemic ensues. Then, the vaccination coverage repeats in a
similar cyclic dynamic. In technical terms, the mean-field
dynamics approaching pc is not robust to noise. Once the
coverage slightly exceeds pc due to noise, the next iterate of the
coverage drops in the vicinity of spc and a severe epidemic occurs
[18]. This model is not generic since an infinitesimal perturbation
of F(:) may shift the attractor away from the boundary, destroying
the sensitivity to noise. However, the biological and sociological
considerations leading to the particular form of the function F(:)
are natural. Consequently, the model may be considered
representative for this application. A similar situation occurs for
models of disease transmission based on ordinary differential
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epidemic threshold is not generic, it is considered representative
assuming no migration of infected individuals.
Stable, noise-robust, fixed-point dynamics prevent the severe
epidemics found in model 1, if and only if ^ p p, the fixed point of the
model under consideration, satisfies the condition
^ p pwspc: ð18Þ
Combining this relation with the stability condition (10) we obtain
that the fixed-point dynamics of the vaccination coverage prevent
the severe epidemics in model 1 if and only if Sv^ p p=pc.
Furthermore, the memory parameter s must belong to the
following interval
s[(S,^ p p=pc):S: ð19Þ
Model 2
We consider that, at the end of every influenza season, the
individuals know the incidence of infection that was realized in
that season.This implies that they also know whether there was an
epidemic: if the incidence was larger than zero then there was an
epidemic; otherwise there was not. If they got vaccinated, then
individuals use the epidemiological information to evaluate their
vaccination decisions. In particular, we assume that the score of
their last vaccination decision equals the seasonal incidence which
also represents the individual-level risk of becoming infected if
unvaccinated; see Eq. (6)
F2(p)~q(p): ð20Þ
We note that other models are possible. For example, more concerned
individuals may use a score function that increases faster with the
incidence; e.g., F2(p)~q(p)
b, where 0vbv1. Here we choose
b~1 for analytical tractability. Hence, the fixed point equation (9)
becomes
q(^ p p2)~^ p p2:h2(^ p p2): ð21Þ
In this case, ^ p p2vpc (see Fig. 1) and noise-robust equilibrium
dynamics of the coverage is possible. The stability bound for s is
S2~1{2=½1{q’(^ p p2) : ð22Þ
Model 3
In this case we assume that, at the end of each influenza season,
the vaccination coverage is disclosed to the public. Additionally,
we assume that individuals know whether there was an epidemic.
An F-function that summarizes this facts is
F3(p)~(1{p)½1{h(p{pc) : ð23Þ
If the epidemic was prevented, then the individuals that got
vaccinated evaluate their last vaccination as unnecessary; i.e.,
F3(p)~0,i fp§pc. Otherwise, they evaluate their last vaccination
as necessary to the degree that their peers did not get vaccinated;
F3(p)~1{p,i fpvpc. These simple assumptions yield in fact a
score function F3(:) that is discontinuous at pc and violates
Assumption F1; see Eq. (23). Hence, the mean-field approximation
of the inductive reasoning game fails for coverage dynamics in the
vicinity of pc. However, the fixed point equation (9) is
q(^ p p3)~^ p p2
3=(1{^ p p3):h3(^ p p3), ð24Þ
and ^ p p3vpc (see Fig. 1). Therefore, the fixed point dynamics of the
one-dimensional map does approximate that of the inductive
reasoning game. Noise-robust equilibrium dynamics of the
coverage is possible. The stability bound for s is
S3~1{2=½{q’(^ p p3)(1{^ p p3)zq(^ p p3)=^ p p3z^ p p3 : ð25Þ
Model 4a
Finally, we discuss the case where both incidence and coverage
are disclosed to the public. First, we assume that the individuals
are avoiding risk of infection by increasing their vaccination scores.
pc
Figure 1. Representation of the possible fixed point equations for the example models. For illustration, we consider pc~0:6 [17,18]. We
assume that q(p)~0 in the shaded region (i.e., where p§pc) and that q(:) is larger than zero and strictly decreasing in the complementary region.
Model 1 has an attractor from the left at pc. For models 2, 3, 4a and 4b, the functions h2,3,4a,4b(p) are represented with thin violet continuous, thick
green continuous, cyan dot-dashed and red dashed lines, respectively. Note that h2(:) and h3(:) intersect at (1=2,1=2), h2(:) and h4a(:) intersect at (1,1),
and h3(:) and h4b(:) intersect at (W,1), where W is the golden ratio conjugate. The function h4a(:) is smaller than h2,3(:) in the unit interval; thus,
^ p p2,3v^ p p4a. When restricted to the unit square, h4b(:) is larger than h2,3(:); thus, ^ p p4bv^ p p2,3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028300.g001
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a posteriori the benefit of their last vaccination not only for
eliminating their personal risk of infection q(p) but also for
contributing to the proportion of successful free-riders
(1{p)½1{q(p) . We consider the following scoring function
F4a(p)~fq(p)z(1{p)½1{q(p) g½1{h(p{pc) 
~1{½1{F2(p) ½1{F3(p) :
ð26Þ
Note that F2,3(p)ƒF4a(p),Vp[½0,1 . The function F4a(:) is
discontinuous at p~pc; model 4a is subject to the same caveat
as model 3 regarding the dynamics in the vicinity of pc. The fixed
point equation (9) becomes
q(^ p p4a)~^ p p2
4a=(1{^ p p4az^ p p2
4a):h4a(^ p p4a): ð27Þ
Noise-robust equilibrium dynamics of the coverage is possible
since ^ p p4avpc (see Fig. 1). The stability bound for s is
S4a~1{2=½{q’(^ p p4a)(1{^ p p4az^ p p2
4a)zq(^ p p4a)
(^ p p4a{1=^ p p4a){^ p p4a :
ð28Þ
Model 4b
In this model, as well, incidence and coverage are disclosed to
the public. We assume that the individuals are risk-seeking in their
attempt to ride on herd immunity. If they got vaccinated, they
evaluate their last vaccination necessary only to the degree that
their peers got infected, using a scoring function that equals the
prevalence
F4b(p)~(1{p)q(p)~F2(p)F3(p): ð29Þ
F4b(:) may also be considered reasonable for the case where
just the prevalence of infection is broadcast. Note that
F4b(p)ƒF2,3(p),Vp[½0,1 . The fixed point equation (9) becomes
q(^ p p4b)~^ p p4b=(1{^ p p2
4b):h4b(^ p p4b): ð30Þ
Once again, noise-robust equilibrium dynamics of the coverage is
possible since ^ p p4bvpc (see Fig. 1). The stability bound for s is
S4b~1{2=½{q’(^ p p4b)(1{^ p p2
4b)zq(^ p p4b)(^ p p4bz1=^ p p4b) : ð31Þ
In Fig. 1, we illustrate the functions h2,3,4a,4b(p) and compare all
the models presented above. The relevant domain is the unit
square; i.e., 0ƒpƒ1 and 0ƒh(p)ƒ1. It is straightforward to
show that
1. h3,4b(p)w1, Vp[(W,1 , where W is the golden ratio conjugate;
2. h2,3(p)§h4a(p), Vp[½0,1 , thus ^ p p2,3v^ p p4a;
3. h4b(p)§h2,3(p), Vp[½0,W , thus ^ p p4bv^ p p2,3.
Thus, among all the models we considered, the ones where
individuals know most about influenza epidemiology (i.e., models
4a and 4b) yield the highest and the lowest value for the fixed point
of the voluntary vaccination coverage. A comparison between ^ p p2
and ^ p p3 awaits a particular choice for the function q(:).
Numerics
For a numerical comparison, we have chosen the q-function
below [17,18]
q(p)~q(0)(1{p=pc)h(pc{p): ð32Þ
We do not present numerics for model 1 since they have been
extensively studied [17,18]. Figure 2 presents maps and bifurcation
diagrams for the other four models where we have chosen pc~0:6
and q(0)~0:8, as in Refs. [17,18]. Each column of panels
Figure 2. Maps and bifurcation diagrams for the example models 2, 3 and 4a and 4b with the q-function given by Eq. (32) having
pc~0:6 and q(0)~0:8 [17,18]. Panels A and E refer to model 2; panels B and F refer to model 3; panels C and G refer to model 4a; and panels D and
H refer to model 4b. Panels A–D represent the model maps M2,3,4a,4b(p;0:7) (thick black line) and M2,3,4a,4b(p;0:1) (thick red line) versus p,
respectively; the thin dot-dashed black line bisects the first quadrant and dashed red vertical line marks p~pc. Panels E–H represent bifurcation
diagrams of the maps M2,3,4a,4b(:;s) versus s, respectively. Continuous lines show how attractors change versus s while dashed lines show how
unstable fixed points change versus s.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028300.g002
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corresponds to model 2, the second column (i.e., panels B and F)
corresponds to model 3, the third column (i.e., panels C and G)
corresponds to model 4a, and the fourth column (i.e., panels D
and H) corresponds to model 4b. Panels A–D represent the model
maps M2,3,4a,4b(p;0:7) (thick black line) and M2,3,4a,4b(p;0:1)
(thick red line) versus p, respectively. Panels D–H represent
bifurcation diagrams of the maps M2,3,4a,4b(:;s) versus s,
respectively. Several comments are in order.
1. The fixed points ^ p p2,3,4a,4b are less than pc (Fig. 2A–D) and
remain constant for changing values of s (Fig. 2E–H).
2. The bifurcation structure of M2(:;s) is not generic because
M2(:;s) is not generic. In fact, since q(p) is piecewise linear,
M2(:;s) is piecewise linear, as well (Fig. 2A). The fixed point ^ p p2
does not undergo a generic period doubling bifurcation
(Proposition 2) because a period two critical orbit becomes
an attractor at the same parameter value where ^ p p2 loses
stability, S2~½q(0)=pc{1 =½q(0)=pcz1  (Fig. 2E). This bifur-
cation structure does not survive smooth arbitrary small
perturbations (Proposition 2).
3. The fixed points ^ p p3 and ^ p p4a do not lose stability for s[½0,1 
because S3 and S4a are negative.
4. The fixed point ^ p p4b loses stability through a direct period
doubling bifurcation.
5. The relations ^ p p4aw^ p p2,3 and ^ p p2,3w^ p p4b hold, as expected from
the general theory.
6. Although ^ p p2v^ p p3, this is not generally true; it is due to the fact
that q(:) is piecewise linear; see Fig. 1.
Figure 3 presents numerical results for the parameter space
f(pc,q(0));pc[½0,1 ,q(0)[½0,1 g. Many features in Fig. 3 can be
addressed analytically; we leave the details to the reader. As in
Fig. 2, each column of panels corresponds to one model: the first
column (i.e., panels A, E, and I) corresponds to model 2, the
second column (i.e., panels B, F, J) corresponds to model 3, the
third column (i.e., panels C, G and K) corresponds to model 4a, and
thefourthcolumn(i.e.,panelsD,HandL)correspondstomodel4b.
Panels A–D show how far the fixed point of each model (i.e.,
^ p p2,3,4a,4b) is from the critical vaccination coverage pc.W en o t et h a t
p4a is closest to pc, p3,2 come next (in order) and p4b last. Panels E–
H plot colormaps for the lower bounds of the intervals of s such that
^ p p2,3,4a,4b are stable (denoted by S2,3,4a,4b), respectively. We remark
that S4avS3vS2vS4b; therefore the stability interval is largest for
model 4a, then model 3, model 2 and last, model 4b. Finally, panels
I–L represent how the sizes of the intervals S2,3,4a,4b vary with pc
and q(0), respectively. We notice that S4a is the largest across all of
the domain, followed (in order) by S3, S2 and S4b.
A model describing a convenient scenario would have the fixed
point coverage close to the critical level, a low value of S so fixed
point stability is achieved even though individuals do not
remember many past vaccination outcomes, and a broad S-
interval for model robustness. Among the models presented here,
model 4a performs best, then model 3, model 2 and last model 4b.
Discussion
Field studies provide evidence of free-riding on influenza herd
immunity. For example, ‘‘self-other’’ optimistic bias about influenza
risk was demonstrated in a sample of New Jersey adults where
three out of four individuals estimated their risk of infection below
average [27]. Using game theory, it was previously shown that, in
the case where individuals know only whether an epidemic takes
place every influenza season, free-riding on herd immunity may
cause severe drops in the vaccination coverage, leading to major
epidemics [17,18]. Furthermore, these major epidemics could be
suppressed by a public health program offering free vaccination
Figure 3. Numerical comparison between the fixed point structure of the example models 2, 3, 4a and 4b with the choice of q-
function given by Eq. (32). We explored the parameter space f(pc,q(0));pc[½0,1 ,q(0)[½0,1 g. Panels A, E and I refer to model 2; panels B, F and J
refer to model 3; panels C, G and K refer to model 4a; and panels D, H and L refer to model 4b. Panels A–D represent how far is the fixed point of each
model from the critical vaccination coverage; i.e., j^ p p2,3,4a,4b{pcj, respectively. Panels E–H represent the lower bound of the memory parameter s such
that the fixed point of the corresponding model is stable; i.e., S2,3,4a,4b, respectively. Panels I–L represent the width of the s-interval where the fixed
point dynamics has coverage above spc; i.e., (^ p p2,3,4a,4b=pc{S2,3,4a,4b), respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028300.g003
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decided to get vaccinated [17]. However, other means of epidemic
control may be investigated. In a society where vaccines are rarely
in short supply, the success of voluntary vaccination programs
depends very much on the perceived benefit of vaccination. Mass
media is an important factor in shaping social trends and its reach
has never been broader. In this work we investigated the potential
impact of epidemiological newscasts on the dynamics of voluntary
vaccination coverage against seasonal influenza infections.
Our first result addresses the possibility of eliminating
influenza epidemics by increasing the vaccination coverage.
Recently, the seasonal influenza vaccination coverage has
steadily increased in the developed world. The average in five
European countries reached 25.9% in 2007–2008 [25], while in
the US the coverage reached 41.1% in 2009–2010 [26]. Still,
these figures fall short of the critical vaccination coverage,
e s t i m a t e dt ob ei nt h er a n g eo f5 0 – 7 0 % ;s e e[ 1 7 ]a n dr e f e r e n c e s
therein. Will the vaccination trend continue such that the
coverage exceeds the critical level year after year, eliminating
influenza epidemics? The answer is most likely no. If the
coverage approached the critical value, epidemic severity would
decline and individuals would no longer perceive the same
benefit in vaccination, instead attempting to free-ride on herd
i m m u n i t y .H e n c e ,e p i d e m i c sw o u l dp e r s i s t .F u r t h e r m o r e ,o u r
study suggests that mass media would not be able to change this
course of events, no matter what epidemiological information
were released to the public to change its perceived benefit of
vaccination (Proposition 1).
Our second result shows that newscasts providing the
individuals with more epidemiological information (e.g., inci-
dence, coverage, or both) may lead to a stable coverage
dynamics, suppressing severe epidemics caused by free-riding of
herd immunity (Proposition 2). Hence, mass media could
effectively be used for public health just as incentives providing
free vaccination [17]. The practical implications of this result
may be profound as newscasts require no compliance from
participants and less logistics than implementation of vaccination
incentives.
O u rt h i r da n dl a s tr e s u l ts t a t e st h a tt h es t a b i l i z e dl e v e lo ft h e
vaccination coverage follows the trend of the perceived
vaccination benefits (Proposition 3). Still, as they learn more
about seasonal influenza epidemiology, individuals have two
major choices in changing their vaccination strategies. First,
they may assign more utility to vaccination, increasing the
overall vaccination coverage. Second, they may take even more
risk to free-ride on herd immunity, causing a decrease in the
vaccination coverage. Which of these two choices would likely
be realized is a difficult question. Using reasonable assumptions,
our example models and numerics show that the vaccination
coverage in the general population could become better or
worse when disclosing both vaccination coverage and disease
incidence than when disclosing either piece of information
separately.
A significant body of literature in cognitive psychology addresses
perception biases of clinical risk (see Refs. [27–29] and references
therein); however, applications to influenza are limited. Data to
characterize the public perception of the benefits of vaccination
and its potential trends when epidemiological information is
broadcast are currently insufficient. A comprehensive study [25] of
seasonal influenza vaccination in the general population was
conducted in five European countries over seven influenza
seasons, identifying reasons invoked pro and contra vaccination.
The chief reasons invoked for getting vaccinated were advice from
a family doctor (58.6%) and the perception of influenza as a
serious illness (51.9%). The two major reasons for not getting
vaccinated were the feeling of not being likely to catch influenza
(39.5%) and never having considered the option of being
vaccinated (35.8%). More field investigations are needed to
explicate these reasons in terms of epidemic variables (e.g.,
prevalence, coverage, etc.) and build realistic models for the score
function F(:). Still, to provide a broad understanding of possible
modeling outcomes, here we investigated several examples of how
mass media may influence individuals’ perceptions of the benefits
of vaccination, by reporting infection incidence and vaccination
coverage. We note that game theory was particularly suited for our
study as it explicitly models risk taking, adaptability and decision
making.
In conclusion, the impact of mass-media on social behavior and,
implicitly, vaccination coverage is complex. Our game theoretic
approach allows for illuminating some of the underlying
mechanisms, proposing new perspectives for public health.
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